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That’s how you could characterize the unsettling decision rendered by the German Federal Administrative Court. A
Berlin high school student performed his ritual Islamic prayer on the school corridor, outside class hours. The school
found that was not ok. The German Federal Administrative Court conﬁrmed. So what’s unsettling?
No balancing…
All major premises formulated by the Administrative Court (which are completely in line with the Federal
Constitutional Court’s case-law) consistently lead to the following statement: “With regard to the freedom of religion
enshrined in Article 4.1, 4.2 of the German Constitution, the student…is entitled to do his prayers at school outside
of class hours” (First Premise). Nonetheless, the appeal was not successful because “this entitlement is subject to
limitations necessary for preserving school peace” (Second Premise). The result: “The restrictions to the
fundamental right pursue an aim that is to be valued higher than the constraints on the fundamental right…
preserving school peace takes precedence over exercising one’s freedom of religion.”
In the realm of fundamental rights, it is actually quite common that although a speciﬁc conduct is generally covered
by a basic right, an individual claim to that conduct might not be granted because the legal interests protected
through the restrictions to the basic right prevail. Quite common? For the past 50 years, didn’t interpreting the
constitution require “practical concordance”, that is to arrange the legal interests protected by the Constitution in
such a way as to avoid realizing one interest at the expense of another? So as to materialize all of them? Even
more: to give optimal eﬀect to each legal interest? In this spirit, the Federal Administrative Court subscribed to the
“principle of careful balance” in its major premise, but then lost sight of it. While rhetorical appraisal of the pros and
cons might be important communicatively, words are not suﬃcient; from a constitutional standpoint, much more
needs to be “delivered”. But let’s leave it at this as an introductory obiter dictum – unfortunately, we all got used to
the ABBA-principle that in the end, someone wins and the other looses: „the winner takes it all.“ None of this has
actually much to do with the ﬁne arts of legal reasoning. That’s unsettling.
… because the school can’t be „schooled“
So what news on school peace? It’s not doing so well. In fact, it’s doing so badly that we cannot really speak of
school peace anymore, but rather of school strife. Just a few examples: amongst students, “there have been
conﬂicts, some of which were rather violent, because some students accused others of disrespecting certain rules of
conduct ﬂowing from a speciﬁc interpretation of the Qur’an. Those rules included wearing a headscarf, fasting, doing
prayers, not eating pork meat, and avoiding ‘indecent behavior’ and ‘indecent clothes’ as well as personal contacts
to ‘impure’ fellow students”. This resulted in “mobbing, insults, in particular with anti-Semitic intentions, threats and
sexist discrimination.” The overall climate was such that “displaying religious conduct, or openly distancing oneself
from religious precepts could easily fuel conﬂict, even if the conduct was rather insigniﬁcant.” That’s unsettling. The
Federal Administrative Court (and the Berlin-Brandenburg Administrative Court as Court of Lower Instance) deserve
credit for describing the situation at the school in unsparing detail. What is irritating in this context is the need felt by
the Federal Administrative Court to repeat time and again that it is bound by the Berlin-Brandenburg Court’s
statements. While this is correct from a legal point of view, it is also common knowledge and does not need to be
repeated more than ten times. On the one hand, this creates an impression of distance – as if the Berlin judges had
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to decide the case, and not the judges in Leipzig. On the other hand, it seems as if the Federal Administrative
Judges wanted to get rid of the case as quickly as possible – either through appeal to the Constitutional Court, or by
putting an end to it.
Fate of the circumstances
On the whole, the Federal Administrative Court is portraying a school where classes may still be held, but where
genuine school life does not happen anymore. How did it get to this point? And what measures are taken to remedy
this? Those questions are important, as they build the basis for the Court’s knockout argument: because things are
as bad as they are, praying is not allowed, or things are going to get worse. In other words: the circumstances seal
the claimant’s fate. Well, something is wrong with that! First: the claimant argued that he did not contribute to the
oppressive conditions; his prayers did not cause any irritation. From a regulatory law point of view, he is a “non-
disturber” and not liable – the others bear the liability. Max Steinbeis provided a straightforward and accurate
analysis on this issue (in reaction to the Court of Lower Instance’s decision); the Federal Administrative Court
formulates more subtly: “It is not the student exercising his freedom of religion, promised (sic!) to him by the German
Basic Law, who disturbs the peace of the school, but the others who take oﬀense by this in a way incompatible with
tolerance.”
Second: there is a school, and there is a state. The state has an educational mandate. (So that we learn how to
treat our freedom and the freedom of others well.) The state is also neutral, i.e. it does not privilege or discriminate
against a speciﬁc religion or faith, but is open to all beliefs. That’s why everyone is coming! But not everyone treats
his or her freedom or the freedom of others well. So what options does the state have? “Where the school has been
able to bring students involved in conﬂicts together to talk, these talks did not yield any results.” Step 1: They tried to
have students talk to each other. Unfortunately without any results. Step 2: negative! Steps 3, 4, 5 (and so on):
negative! Didn’t happen! Reason: “the school’s possibilities of solving religiously motivated conﬂicts through
educational measures are limited”, especially in an environment where “dealing with single incidents does not seem
very promising in view of the eﬀort that each incident requires.”  I am not in the education business, but I can think of
more options once talks have failed. The school also has the possibility of applying disciplinary measures. Then,
there is the law of administrative oﬀences. And lastly, the decision spoke of “insults, in particular with anti-Semitic
intentions”. That’s where (juvenile) criminal law comes into play. There are diﬀerentiated means on all levels, but
they need to be applied, too!
So what is the state doing? It doesn’t do anything! It surrenders and thus denies protection to those who wanted to
do what the state “wanted” them to do, and what they have a right to. And it leaves the disturbers undisturbed. From
a regulatory law point of view, the state thus transforms into a disturber: “disturber by status”[1]. The Federal
Administrative Court’s decision means exactly that: what’s right is yielding to what’s wrong.[2] That’s unsettling. In
fact, that’s state bankruptcy of quite a unique nature!
“Anyplace, anywhere, anytime”
So what’s left for the claimant in view of the circumstances? He could change schools, because he does have a
right to pray in a healthy school environment. Just not at his school. Can this be right?
The Federal Administrative Court’s decision might enter legal history as the “Nena-decision”: You can pray –
“anyplace, anywhere, anytime”.
(Translation: Hannah Birkenkötter)
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[1] German regulatory law diﬀerentiates between two types of “disturbers” (“Störer”; a disturber is a person who is
liable for violation of a regulatory provision [tortfeasor, but in regulatory terms]), namely “disturber via action”
(“Handlungsstörer”, a person who violates regulatory norms by his or her actions) and “disturber via status”
(“Zustandsstörer”, a person who is responsible for a speciﬁc situation which does not comply with regulatory norms
by his or her legal status, e.g. the owner of a contaminated property)
[2] This is a variation of the phrase “What is right does not have to yield to what is wrong”, a modern translation of
“Vim vi repellere licet” used in (German) criminal law to explain the concept of self-defense.
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